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In this paper, we consider how rich sources of information on con-
sumer choice can help to identify demand parameters in a widely used
class of differentiated products demand models. Most important, we
show how to use “second-choice” data on automotive purchases to
obtain good estimates of substitution patterns in the automobile in-
dustry. We use our estimates to make out-of-sample predictions about
important recent changes in industry structure.
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I. Introduction
In this paper, we consider how rich sources of information on consumer
choice can help to identify demand parameters in a widely used class
of differentiated products demand models. The demand framework is
a class of differentiated product demand models whose foundations date
back at least to Lancaster (1972) and McFadden (1974). In these models,
products are described as bundles of characteristics, and consumers
choose the product that maximizes the utility derived from product
characteristics.
We follow in a tradition that seeks to uncover basic parameters of
demand and supply so that we can obtain a detailed analysis of past
events and make realistic predictions about out-of-sample policies and
changes in industry structure. To illustrate, we conclude with an analysis
of two of our sample changes: the recent decision of General Motors
to shut down its historic Oldsmobile division and the introduction of
luxury sport utility vehicles (SUVs). Our data indicate tight substitution
patterns between similar products, and so our estimates predict that
General Motors will hold on to a substantial fraction of its former Olds-
mobile customers. Also, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant potential demand for “high-
end” SUVs in 1993, consistent with the later introduction of such
vehicles.
Our estimates make use of a novel data set, provided to us by General
Motors, that surveys recent purchasers of automobiles. The most novel
aspect of our data is the presence of consumers’ “second choices”—the
purchase that they would have made if their preferred product were
not available. In our example, we ﬁnd that this kind of data is very
helpful in estimating the model parameters that govern the predicted
pattern of substitution across products. The second-choice data are sim-
ilar to other kinds of survey data on product rankings, although they
may be of higher quality because our consumers have recently com-
pleted a very expensive and somewhat time-consuming purchase.
In earlier work (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995), we empha-
sized estimation strategies based on changes across markets (or across
time) in the choice set facing consumers. In that work, we assume that
the distribution of consumers’ underlying tastes, conditional on an ob-
served distribution of consumer incomes and demographics, is invariant
across markets/time. We then propose to estimate substitution patterns
from data on how choices vary as the characteristics and numbers of
products, as well as the distribution of observed consumer attributes,
change across markets. Thus, in our earlier paper and related papers,
the model parameters that govern substitution patterns are estimated
from data on (i) how consumers substitute across products when the
characteristics, prices, and number of products change and (ii) how the70 journal of political economy
distribution of consumer attributes changes choices for a given choice
set.
Many authors have also made use of data that match consumer at-
tributes to consumer choices. (This includes most of the early discrete
choice demand literature and also recent work in industrial organization
by Goldberg [1995] and Petrin [2002].) These data, together with
changing choice sets, can help to estimate substitution patterns to the
degree that these patterns are explained by observed consumer attri-
butes. For example, Petrin ﬁnds that consumer attribute data (together
with a dramatically changing choice set) are quite useful in explaining
substitution patterns (and welfare results) for minivans.
1
In the present paper, the second-choice data provide an alternative
source of identiﬁcation. These second-choice data have several strong
advantages. First, they give us a direct, data-based measure of substitu-
tion. As a result, we can ask what classes of models are capable of
reproducing this observed pattern of substitution. For example, we ﬁnd
that models without unobserved heterogeneity (but with observed con-
sumer attributes) do a bad job of reproducing observed substitution
patterns. Also, and perhaps more important, by requiring the model
parameters to match the observed second-choice substitution patterns,
we gain a source of identifying power that does not rely on exogenous
changes in choice sets.
We do ﬁnd, however, the not very surprising result that second-choice
data on a single-market cross section of products (without any variation
in prices for a given vehicle) cannot by themselves identify the absolute
level of price elasticities (as opposed to the pattern of substitution across
products). Thus, even high-quality second-choice data will not solve all
estimation problems in this class of models. In the context of our single
cross section of data, we discuss several ways of bringing information
from outside sources to ﬁx the level of price elasticities. This allows us
to perform our policy experiments.
2
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst review the basic empirical
differentiated products demand model from the recent industrial or-
ganization literature. We then describe our estimation procedure, em-
phasizing the role it gives to different sources of data. After describing
the data and the parameter estimates, we provide results on the policy
experiments.
1 The result for minivans is consistent with our results as well, but we show that other
automotive choices are not as closely tied to commonly observed consumer attributes.
Also note that variation in consumer attributes sometimes effectively changes the choice
set: if one does not live near public transportation, then it is not really an option.
2 Future work might focus on combining different sources of information, including
the kind of cross-market data that we ourselves used in earlier work.differentiated products 71
II. The Model
We start from the model in Berry et al. (1995) (BLP), which is a model
of household choice that is then explicitly aggregated to obtain product-
level demands. It is therefore able to analyze both our micro data on
household choices and our aggregate data on product-level demands
in one consistent framework.
Largely for simplicity, we use a linear version of the utility, , that uij
consumer i obtains from the choice of product j (this follows the tra-
ditional discrete choice random coefﬁcients literature, e.g., Domencich
and McFadden [1975] or Hausman and Wise [1978]). Let j p 0, …,
index the products competing in the market, where product is Jj p 0
the “outside” good (so that is the utility of the consumer if she does ui0
not purchase any of these J goods and instead allocates all income to
other purchases). Let k index the observed (by us) product character-
istics, including price, and r index the observed household attributes.
Our model is then
˜ u p x b  y  e ,( 1 )  ij jk ik j ij
k
with
ou ˜ ¯ b p b  z b  bn, (2)  ik k ir kr k ik
r
where the and are, respectively, observed and unobserved product x y jk j
characteristics, the represent the “taste” of consumer i for product ˜ bik
characteristic k, the and are vectors of observed and unobserved z n ii
consumer attributes, and the represent idiosyncratic individual pref- eij
erences, assumed to be independent of the product attributes and of
each other. Note that the model allows consumers to differ in their
tastes for different product characteristics. Those differences (the ) ˜ b
are allowed (via eq. [2]) to depend on both consumer attributes observed
by the econometrician (through , where the o superscript is for “ob-
o b
served”) and attributes that the econometrician does not observe
(through , where u is for “unobserved”).
3 In our example the z vectors
u b
contain consumer attributes listed in our data (e.g., income, family size,
and age of household head), and the n vectors allow for consumer
attributes that are not in our data (e.g., distance to work or a need to
3 Equations (1) and (2) make several simplifying assumptions, including that there is
only one unobserved product characteristic and consumers do not differ in their pref-
erences for it. These simpliﬁcations are not necessary for the argumentsthatfollow,though
they simplify both the exposition and the subsequent computations; see Heckman and
Snyder (1997) for a related model with a higher dimension of unobserved characteristics
and Das, Olley, and Pakes (1994) for an attempt to let consumersdifferintheirpreferences
for the unobserved characteristic in this model.72 journal of political economy
transport a little league team). Similarly, the are auto characteristics xk
that we measure (e.g., price, size, and horsepower) and the y are un-
measured aspects of car quality.
We want to stress two features of this framework: the interaction terms
and the product-speciﬁc constant terms. First, as noted in the earlier
literature (see McFadden et al. 1977; Hausman and Wise 1978; Berry
et al. 1995), the interaction between consumer tastes and product char-
acteristics determines substitution patterns in discrete choice models.
As the variance in the random tastes for product characteristics in-
creases, similar products (in the space of x’s) become better substitutes.
Models without individual differences in preferences for characteristics
generate demand substitution patterns that are known to be a priori
unreasonable (depending only on market shares and not on the char-
acteristics of the vehicles). A goal of this paper is to provide accurate
measures of substitution patterns, and so we allow for unobserved (as
well as observed) determinants of characteristic preferences.
Second, vehicles (and most other consumer products) are differen-
tiated from one another in many dimensions. We shall include char-
acteristics that proxy for the most important sources of differentiation,
but even if we had the data, we could not hope to estimate the distri-
bution of preferences over a set of characteristics that is large enough
to capture all aspects of product differentiation. The role of the unob-
served product characteristic, y, is to pick up the total impact of the
characteristics not included in our speciﬁcation. As stressed in Berry
(1994) and in Berry et al. (1995), one might expect y to be correlated
with price: products with higher unmeasured quality might sell at a
higher price. This is the differentiated product analogue of the standard
“simultaneity” problem in demand analysis, and our previous work in-
dicates that when we do not account for this correlation, we obtain
unreasonably small (in absolute value) price elasticities.
The consumer-level choice model is found by substituting equation
(2) into (1) to obtain
ou u p d  xzb  x nb e , (3)  ij j jk ir kr jk ik k ij
kr k
where, for , j p 0, 1, …, J
¯ d p x b  y . (4)  jj k k j
k
This equation clariﬁes two important points about the identiﬁcation
of our model. First, even without an assumption on the joint distribution
of (y, x), the micro data allow us to estimate some but not all of the
parameters of the model. Second, the remaining parameters determinedifferentiated products 73
the elasticities of interest, and identifying these parameters requires
assumptions of the sort used in market-level data.
To see that some parameters are identiﬁed without assumptions on
(y, x), note that equation (3) deﬁnes a traditional random coefﬁcients
discrete choice model with choice-speciﬁc constant terms, . Given para- dj
metric assumptions on (n, e) and standard regularity conditions, we can
therefore obtain consistent estimators of the parameter vector v p (d,
from micro data (such as our CAMIP data) without assumptions
ou b , b )
about the unobservable y’s.
4 Some questions of interest require only
these parameters. One important example is the calculation of ideal
price indices (see Pakes, Berry, and Levinsohn 1993) (Sec. VII contains
another example).
However, knowledge of does not identify own and cross-
ou v p (d, b , b )
price (and characteristic) elasticities. Unless product characteristics have
no systematic effect on demand ( ), the choice-speciﬁc constant d ¯ b { 0
is itself a function of product characteristics. Thus to calculate the impact
of, say, price on demand, we need to know the impact of price on d;
that is, we need . ¯ b
Equation (4) indicates that the number of observations on d that can
be used to estimate equals the number of products: effectively we ¯ b
have to estimate from the product-level data. Consequently, we cannot ¯ b
identify without some assumption on the joint distribution of (y, x). ¯ b
This is exactly the same identiﬁcation problem faced by BLP. As noted
in that article and elsewhere (Nevo 2000), different assumptions on the
joint distribution of (y, x) can be used to identify the remaining pa-
rameters. To account for the simultaneity problem, BLP assume that
the are mean independent of the nonprice characteristics of all the yj
products. We make use of this and other possible restrictions below.
To return to the implications of our model, market-level aggregate
consumer behavior is obtained by summing the choices implied by the
individual utility model over the population’s distribution of consumer
attributes. Let be the vector of both the observed ( ) and unobserved wz ii
( , ) individual attributes, , and denote its distribution ne w p (z, n, e) ii i iii
in the population by . The fraction of households that choose good Pw
j (aggregate demand) is given by integrating over the set of attributes
that imply a preference for good j:
ou s(d, b , b ; x, P ) p P (dw), (5) j w  w
ou A (d,b ,b ;x) j
4 See also Ichimura and Thompson (1998), who discuss non- and semiparametric
identiﬁcation.74 journal of political economy
where
ou ou A (d, b , b ; x) p {w :m a x [ u (w; d, b , b , x)] p u }. ji r i j
rp0,1,…,J
Just as the basic form of equation (1) is familiar from the econometric
discrete choice literature (see, e.g., McFadden 1981), the notion of
aggregating discrete choices to market demand has been used exten-
sively in the industrial organization literature on product differentiation.
An early example is Hotelling (1929); Anderson, DePalma, and Thisse
(1992) provide a more recent discussion with extensive references.
III. Estimation
We begin with an outline of our estimation procedure focusing on the
role it gives to alternative data sources. The reader who is not interested
in the technical detail should be able to proceed directly from subsection
A to the section that introduces the data (Sec. IV). Subsection B explains
how we compute the objective function. The Appendix outlines how
we construct our standard errors.
A. Outline of the Estimation Procedure
Since our micro data allow us to estimate choice-speciﬁc constant terms,
we faced a choice of whether to estimate the vector or
ou v p (b , b , d)
to impose enough additional restrictions on the joint distribution of (y,
x) to enable us to identify and estimate only . Formally, the
ou ¯¯ b (b , b , b)
trade-off here is familiar: gaining efﬁciency from additional restrictions
versus losing consistency if those restrictions are wrong.
We chose to estimate v without imposing any additional restrictions
for two reasons. First, the CAMIP data set is large, so we are not par-
ticularly concerned with precision. Second, as noted in BLP, the distri-
bution of (y, x) is partly determined by product development decisions,
so a priori restrictions on it are hard to evaluate. Our choice implies
estimates of that are robust to assumptions on the (y, x) dis-
ou (b , b )
tribution. We then use the estimated d’s to estimate using various ¯ b
assumptions on (y, x) (Sec. VI).
Efﬁciency considerations argue for using maximum likelihood esti-
mates of v, but this was too computationally burdensome (see app. A
of our earlier working paper [Berry et al. 2001]). Therefore, we use a
method of moments estimator. This compares the moments predicted
by our model for different values of v to our sample’s moments and
then chooses the value of v that minimizes the “distance” between the
model’s predictions and the data.
We matched three “sets” of predicted moments to their data ana-differentiated products 75
logues: (1) the covariances of the observed ﬁrst-choice product char-
acteristics, the x, with the observed consumer attributes, the z (e.g., the
covariance of family size and ﬁrst-choice vehicle size); (2) the covari-
ances between the ﬁrst-choice product characteristics and the second-
choice product characteristics (e.g., the covariance of the size of the
ﬁrst-choice vehicle with the size of the second-choice vehicle); and (3)
the market shares of the J products.
The ﬁrst set of moments match observed consumer attributes to the
characteristics of the chosen vehicles. We think of these moments as
particularly useful for estimating , the coefﬁcients on the interactions
o b
between observed product characteristics and household attributes (x
and z).
5 If the ﬁrst-choice car characteristics are denoted by and z
1 x
denotes household attributes, we ﬁt the model’s predictions for
and for to their CAMIP sample analogues. We include in
1   E(xz) E(z)
a separate moment condition for each interaction term in the
1   E(xz)
utility speciﬁcation. Since the CAMIP sampling rates are roughly in
proportion to market share, the expectation is roughly the expected E(z)
value of the attributes of households that chose to buy a car. The
moments are therefore particularly useful in estimating the param- E(z)
eters that deﬁne the utility of the outside good.
The second set of moments, between ﬁrst- and second-choice char-
acteristics, are particularly useful in identifying the importance of the
unobserved consumer characteristics. Note that if all relevant consumer
attributes were observed ( ), then the coefﬁcients of the observed
u b p 0
consumer attributes, , would determine both the ﬁrst- and second-
o b
choice vehicle characteristics and hence the correlation between them.
If the model with predicts a ﬁrst/second-choice correlation that
u b { 0
is much less than the correlation found in the data, we would conclude
that the are necessary to explain observed substitution patterns. Our
u b
speciﬁcation has one element of for each included car characteristic,
u b
and we include a predicted ﬁrst/second-choice covariance for each such
characteristic.
As noted in Berry (1994), given , there is a unique d that
ou b { (b , b )
matches the observed market shares equal to the model’s predicted
share. So the third set of moments are particularly useful in estimating
the d parameters.
B. The Fitted Moments
This subsection explains how we compute the moments that go into
our method of moments estimation algorithm and considers the limit
5 If and we used only ﬁrst-choice data, then the aggregate shares used in BLP
o b p 0
would be sufﬁcient statistics for the ﬁrst-choice data, and the match of individuals to the
car they chose would contain no additional information.76 journal of political economy
distribution of the parameter estimates. This requires some additional
notation, an introduction to our data sets, and assumptions on the joint
distribution of the household attributes.
Let N indicate the number of households in the U.S. population (over
100 million). Then the product-level data consist of J couples, ,
N (s , x ) jj
where is the share of the population that purchased vehicle j, and
N sj
is a vector of the vehicle’s observed characteristics (one of which is xj
price, ). The equation is the fraction of the population
NN ps p 1  s j 0 j j
that does not purchase one of our J vehicles. Our model implies that
the market share observed in the data, say , distributes multinomially
N s
about , where represents the true value of that s(d , b ; x, P )( b , d ) 00 w 00
vector, and has a covariance matrix whose elements are all less than
.
1 N
The consumer-level, or CAMIP, data are a choice-based sample drawn
from new vehicle registrations. General Motors determines the number
of households to sample from the registrations for each vehicle, say
, and then the characteristics of the households sampled and their nj
second-choice vehicles are found. We let and index the num- n p nj j
ber of households in the CAMIP data by . The expression i p 1, …, n
is our notation for the event that the ﬁrst choice of household
1 y p j i
i is vehicle j, and indicates that the second choice is vehicle k.
2 y p k i
To derive the predictions of the model, we have to specify a joint
distribution for the observed and unobserved consumer attributes, the
, and the couples. Since the Current Population Survey (CPS) z (n, e) ii i
is a random sample of U.S. households, we can use it to sample from
directly. The (n, e) couples are assumed to distribute independently Pz
of z and of each other. Recall that the means of these variables go into
the constant terms (the d). We assume that the deviations from the
means (our n) are independent, normal random variables. Thus can
u bk
be interpreted as the standard deviation of the unobserved distribution
of tastes for vehicle characteristic k. The sole exception to this is the
unobserved characteristic that interacts with price, which is assumed to
be lognormal (this allows us to impose the constraint that no one prefers
higher prices; see eq. [14] below for more detail). These assumptions
give us the marginal distribution of n, denoted . Pn
Finally, for computational simplicity, we assume that the idiosyncratic
errors, the , have an independently and identically distributed extreme eij
value “double exponential” distribution. This assumption yields the logit
functional form for the model’s choice probabilities conditional o na( z,
n) couple:
ou exp(d  xzb  x nb) jj k i r k r j k i k k kr k
1 Pr(y p jFz, n, v, x) p . (6) ii i ou 1  exp(d  xzb  x nb) qq k i r k r q k i k k qk r kdifferentiated products 77
Note that the choice probabilities in (6) are an easy to calculate function
of z, n, and v.
We now move to the computation of our moments. The moments for
the aggregate shares are treated slightly differently in order to solve
another computational problem. Since we have over 200 car models, d
has 200 elements, and a search over v is a search over about 250 di-
mensions. Since we cannot search over that many dimensions effectively,
we use the aggregate moments to “concentrate out” the d parameter
and then search only over b.
Recall that the variance of is of order and
N 1 s  s(d , b ; x, P ) N 00 w
. Consequently, if we could calculate exactly, an efﬁcient
1 N ≈ 0 s( 7)
method of moments algorithm would chose v so that . So we
N s ≈ s( 7)
(i) use the contraction provided by BLP to ﬁnd the value of d that makes
, say , for each guess at b; (ii) substitute that
NN s { s(b, d; 7) d(b, s ; 7)
for d into the model’s predictions for the micro moments,
N d(b, s ; 7)
making them a function of ; and (iii) then search to ﬁnd
N (b, d(b, s ; 7))
the value of b that minimizes the distance between those predictions
and the data. This procedure eliminates any need for a search over d,
and the contraction mapping in Berry et al. (1995) solves for
N d(b, s ;
quite quickly. 7)
To implement this procedure, we need to compute the market shares
predicted by our model for different values of v, that is, to integrate
the probability in equation (6) over the distribution of (z, n). Unfor-
tunately, that integral does not have an analytic form. Consequently, we
follow Pakes (1986) and use simulation to approximate its value. Spe-
ciﬁcally, let , for , index ns random draws on a couple (z , n) r p 1, …, ns rr
whose ﬁrst component, , is taken from the CPS and whose second zr
component, , is taken from the assumed distribution of n. We then n r
deﬁne implicitly as the value of this vector that sets
6 ns,N d (b)
ns 1 3 N 1 ns,M G (v) p s  Pr(y p jFz, n, b, d (b)) (7)  ns,Nj r r ns rp1
to zero (and can be found quickly with the BLP contraction mapping).
Note that we draw the couples once at the beginning of the (z, n) rr
algorithm and hold them constant thereafter. This ensures that the limit
theorems in Pakes and Pollard (1989) apply to our estimators. This use
of simulation does, however, put simulation error in our estimates of d
given b, and this affects the asymptotic variance of the estimates of b
(see the Appendix).
Next we calculate the model’s predictions for the covariances between
6 In practice we do not just take random draws from the distributions of z and n, but
rather use importance sampling techniques, analogous to those used in BLP, to reduce
the variance of our estimated integrals.78 journal of political economy
the ﬁrst-choice car characteristics and household attributes. Since the
CAMIP data are choice-based, the moments we have to ﬁt to the data
are the model’s predictions for the attributes of a household that chose
a particular vehicle. To form the sample moment, we interact the average
attributes of households that chose vehicle j with the characteristics of
that vehicle and then average over the different vehicles (using the
CAMIP sampling weights). That is, our ﬁrst-choice moments are
nj nj 11 11 G (b) ≈ x (n ) z  E[zFy p j, b] , (8)  n,ns,Nk j j i i j {} n ji p1 j
where, at the risk of some misunderstanding, it is now understood that
when we condition on b we are conditioning on .
ns,N (b, d (b; 7))
We use an approximation sign in equation (8) to indicate that we
cannot calculate exactly. To obtain our approximation we
1 E[zFy p j, b]
use Bayes’ rule to rewrite
7
1 zPr(y p jFz, b)P(dz) ∫ z
11 E[zFy p j, b] p zP(dzFy p j, b) p  1 Pr(y p j, b) z
and substitute from the model’s predictions for the choice probabilities
(eq. [6]) to obtain
1 zPr(y p jFz, n, b)P(dz, dn) ∫∫ z n
1 E[zFy p j, b] p . (9) 1 Pr(y p j, b)
For each value of b, our model’s prediction for the denominator of
(9) will, by virtue of the choice of , exactly equal . However,
N,ns N d (b) sj
we have to simulate the integral in the numerator. Using the same draws
on we used in equation (7), we obtain our approximation as (z, n) rr
11 ns,N (ns)  z Pr(y p jFz, n, b, d (b)) rr r r
1 E[zFy p j, b] ≈ . (10) N sJ
The ﬁrst-choice moments we use are formed by substituting (10) into
(8).
An analogous procedure is used to form the moments for the covar-
iances between the characteristics of the ﬁrst- and second-choice vehi-
cles. Consider only the households whose ﬁrst choice was vehicle j. For
those households, the difference between the average value of char-
acteristic k of the second-choice vehicle they list in their responses and
7 This follows the literature on choice-based sampling (see Manski and Lerman 1977;
Cosslett 1981; Imbens and Lancaster 1994).differentiated products 79
the average value of characteristic k for the second-choice vehicles pre-
dicted by our model is
n 1 21 2 1 x {y p q}{y p j}  Ex {y p q}dy p j, b ,( 1 1 )   kq i i kq i () {[ ] } n ip1 q(jq (j j
where is the indicator function for the event that vehicle q is
2 {y p q} i
the second choice. We interact this difference with and use the
1 xkj
CAMIP sample weights to average over ﬁrst choices to obtain the
moment
n n 1 j 21 2 1 G (b) ≈ xx {y p q}{y p j}   n,ns,Nk j k q i i () [ nn jq (ji p1 j
21  Pr(y p qdy p j, z, n, b)P (dz)P (dn) . (12)  z n ]
z n
To calculate the expectation in (12), we note that the second-choice
probabilities conditional on , that is,
12 1 (y p j, z, n, b)P r ( y p kdy p j,
, are given by the standard “logit” form in (6) modiﬁed to take z, n, b)
both vehicle j and the outside alternative out of the choice set (this
changes the denominator in the choice probability, eliminating both
the one and the jth element in the summation sign). After substituting
this into the integrand in (12), we approximate that integral by simu-
lation (as in [8]).
We stack and and use the two-step generalized method of
12 G ( 7) G ( 7)
moments estimator (see Hansen 1982) of b from the stacked moments.
Provided that and as , standard arguments show that ns r  N r  n r 
this estimator is consistent. Since N is large relative to n and ns in our
example, we use the limit distribution for b that assumes that as n r
, , but converges to a positive constant (this ensures that  N/n r  ns/n
we adjust our variances for simulation error). That limit distribution is
normal, and the Appendix explains how to obtain consistent estimates
of its covariance matrix.
IV. Data
We begin with a description of the CAMIP data. They contain the results
of a propriety survey conducted on behalf of the General Motors Cor-
poration (GM) and are generally not available to researchers outside
of the company. This survey is a sample from the set of vehicle regis-
trations in the 1993 model year. For each vehicle, a given number of
purchasers are sampled. The intent is to create a random sample con-
ditional on purchased vehicle. The sampled vehicles consist of almost80 journal of political economy
TABLE 1
Comparison of Consumer Samples
Income Range
Percentage
in CPS
Percentage
in CAMIP
CPS Group
Mean
CAMIP
Mean
0–36,500 64.17 25.00 16.90 25.96
36,500–55,000 16.97 23.16 44.89 45.43
55,000–85,000 12.34 26.71 66.93 67.46
85,000– 6.52 25.13 114.25 148.19
All 100.00 100.00 34.17 72.27
Other Demographics
Family size 2.36 2.65
Age of household head 46.80 46.18
Number of kids .66 .58
Urban .46 .35
Rural .25 .35
Suburban .29 .30
all vehicles sold in the United States in 1993, not just GM products.
The subsample we use contains 37,500 observations (see app. C in Berry
et al. [2001] for more details).
The CAMIP questionnaire asks about a limited number of household
attributes, including income, age of the household head, family size,
and place of residence (urban, rural, etc.). We match each of the house-
hold attribute questions to a question in the CPS.
8 Table 1 compares
the distribution of household characteristics in the CAMIP sample to
those in the CPS. Not surprisingly, CAMIP samples disproportionately
from higher-income groups. Households that buy new vehicles, espe-
cially high-priced ones, tend to have disproportionately high incomes.
A more surprising difference between the two samples is that the CAMIP
sample is signiﬁcantly less urban and more rural than the overall U.S.
population. Apparently the rural population purchases a dispropor-
tionate number of vehicles, which helps explain the high share of trucks
in total vehicle sales.
A. The Choice Set
To deﬁne a choice set, we need to classify vehicles into a list of distinct
models and associate characteristics and quantities sold with those mod-
els. Roughly, our list of vehicles was determined by the sampling cells
used to form the data GM provided to us (see Berry et al. [2001, app.
C] for details). This was detailed enough to allow us to construct a
8 The match is generally good, although the CPS questions are usually less ambiguously
worded than the CAMIP questions. The CAMIP survey does not ask about the education
of the household head. There is a question about the education of the driver of the car,
but that is hard to match to a question in the CPS.differentiated products 81
choice set of 203 vehicles (147 cars, 25 SUVs, 17 vans, and 14 pickup
trucks).
9
The CAMIP survey contains information on the characteristics of the
cars actually sold and on their transaction prices (most studies must
make do with the characteristics of a “base” model and list prices). As
our we used the characteristics of the modal vehicle for each CAMIP xj
vehicle sample cell (i.e., the combination of options that was most com-
monly purchased), and for our we used the average price of the modal pj
vehicle. Table 2 provides vehicle characteristics by type of vehicle and
the deﬁnitions of the vehicle characteristics used throughout the paper.
There were about 10.6 million vehicles sold in 1993, and they were sold
at an average price of $18,500. This gives total sales of about $196 billion.
The light truck market alone had sales of $81.2 billion.
Table 3 provides the characteristics of a selected set of vehicles. Many
of the interesting implications of our estimates are best evaluated at a
vehicle level of aggregation. To give some idea of these implications
without overwhelming the reader with details, we display them only for
the illustrative sample of 17 vehicles in table 3. These vehicles were
selected because they all have sales that are large relative to the sales
of vehicles of their type and because, between them, they cover the
major types of vehicles sold.
10
B. Characteristics of the Micro Data
Table 4 provides the mean characteristics of vehicles chosen by the
different demographic groups in the CAMIP sample. A number of in-
teractions between observed household attributes and car characteristics
stand out including kids with minivan, income with price, rural with
pickup and with all-wheel drive, and age and nearly everything.
11 We
used this table and others like it to suggest interactions to include in
our speciﬁcation for utility.
One of the very useful features of the CAMIP data is the presence of
second-choice information. Table 5 provides information on second
choices for our “representative” sample of vehicles. The ﬁrst column
9 In most of the runs we used 218 vehicles. However, in the later runs (reported below),
we aggregated 15 very expensive vehicles (an average price of $74,000 and a composite
market share of 0.3 percent of vehicles sold) into one “super-luxury” model. Because of
the very small shares of these luxury cars, this cut computational time considerablywithout
changing the nature of the results.
10 The list includes 10 cars (three of them luxury cars), a relatively low- and high-priced
minivan, a relatively low- and high-priced jeep, a compact and a full-sized pickup, and a
full-sized van.
11 Older households tend to purchase larger (and therefore heavier) cars with both
more safety features and more accessories. They also tend to stay away from SUVs and
pickups.8
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TABLE 2
Vehicle Characteristics by Size/Type of Vehicle
Vehicle Type Total Q*
Mean
Price*
Mean
Pass
Mean
HP
Mean
Safe
Mean
Acc
Mean
MPG
Mean
Allw
Mean
PUPayl
Mean
SUVPayl
Number of
Vehicles
2-passenger car 57.5 28.5 2 7.1 2 4 20 0 0 0 6
4-passenger car 951.3 15.7 4 4.8 1 3 26 .004 0 0 35
5-passenger car 3,829.7 17.5 5 4.7 1 3 23 .005 0 0 84
≥6-passenger car 1,374.1 21.5 6 4.8 1 4 19 0 0 0 22
Minivan 858.3 19.4 7 4.2 1 3 18 0 0 0 13
SUV 1,163.9 23.3 5 4.4 1 3 15 .9 0 1.3 25
Pickup 2,049.2 15.0 3 4.2 1 2 18 .003 2.0 0 14
Van 269.8 25.0 7 4.1 1 3 14 0 0 0 04
Total 10,553.7 18.4 4.9 4.6 1 2.9 20 .11 .39 .14 203
Note.—All means are sales weighted. Variable deﬁnitions for vehicle characteristics. Q: U.S. sales and leases to consumers (from Polk); price: average price for modal
car; HP: horsepower/weight for engine of modal car (“acceleration”); Pass: number of passengers (“size”); MPG: city miles per gallon from Environmental Protection Agency
for modal engine/body style; Acc: number of power accessories of modal car (e.g., power windows, power doors); Safe: safety features: sum of antilock brakes plus airbags;
Payl: payload in thousands of pounds, for light trucks (from Wards and Automotive News); Minivan: dummy equal to one if minivan; SUV: dummy equal to one if SUV; PU:
dummy equal to one if pickup; Van: dummy equal to one if full-size van; Sport: dummy equal to one if sports car (as deﬁned by consumer publications); Allw: dummy equal
to one if four-wheel or all-wheel drive; PUPayl: PU#Payl; SUVPayl: SUV#Payl.
* In thousands.8
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of Selected Vehicles
Model Q* Price* Pass HP Safe Acc MPG Allw Miniv SUV PU Van PUPayl SUVPayl
Geo Metro 83.7 7.8 4 3.0 0 0 46 0 0 0 0 0 .00 .00
Cavalier 184.8 11.5 5 4.4 1 2 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Escort 207.7 11.5 5 3.6 0 1 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Corolla 140.0 14.5 5 5.0 1 1 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sentra 134.0 11.8 4 4.7 0 2 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accord 321.2 17.3 5 4.5 1 4 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taurus 221.7 17.7 6 4.5 1 4 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Legend 42.5 32.4 5 5.7 2 4 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seville 33.7 43.8 5 7.9 2 5 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lexus LS400 21.9 51.3 5 6.5 2 5 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Caravan 216.9 17.6 7 4.3 1 2 19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Quest 38.2 20.5 7 3.9 0 4 17 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Cherokee 160.3 25.9 5 5.4 2 4 15 1 0 1 0 0 0 1.15
Trooper 18.7 22.8 5 4.5 1 4 15 1 0 1 0 0 0 1.21
GMC Full-Size Pickup 141.2 16.8 3 4.2 1 3 17 0 0 0 1 0 2.2 0
Toyota Pickup 175.1 13.8 3 4.4 0 0 23 0 0 0 1 0 1.64 0
Econovan 116.3 24.5 7 3.4 1 3 14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
* In thousands.8
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TABLE 4
Vehicle Characteristics of Different Demographic Groups
Group Price HP Pass Acc Safe Sport MPG Allw Miniv SUV Van PUPayl SUVPayl
Age:
≤30 16.6 4.7 4.5 2.6 .8 .20 22.0 .13 .03 .15 .001 .24 .18
30–50 20.1 4.8 4.9 3.1 1.1 .15 20.4 .13 .08 .13 .009 .18 .18
150 22.4 4.9 5.1 3.4 1.3 .07 19.8 .06 .04 .04 .011 .19 .07
Kids:
0 20.9 4.9 4.8 3.2 1.1 .14 20.4 .10 .03 .09 .006 .20 .12
1 19.2 4.7 4.8 3.0 1.0 .13 21.0 .12 .06 .11 .006 .20 .15
2 20.1 4.6 5.3 3.1 1.0 .08 19.9 .12 .18 .13 .020 .16 .18
Family size:
1 19.8 4.9 4.7 3.1 1.1 .20 21.2 .09 .01 .08 .003 .20 .12
2 21.5 4.9 4.9 3.3 1.2 .11 20.1 .10 .04 .09 .007 .20 .12
3 19.7 4.7 5.0 3.1 1.0 .12 20.5 .11 .10 .12 .012 .19 .16
Urban 20.6 4.8 4.9 3.2 1.1 .13 20.7 .10 .05 .10 .009 .14 .14
Suburban 21.7 5.0 4.9 3.4 1.2 .15 20.3 .10 .06 .10 .006 .10 .14
Rural 19.2 4.7 4.9 3.0 1.0 .11 20.2 .12 .06 .11 .010 .31 .14
Income:
≤37,000 16.6 4.6 4.8 2.6 .88 .12 21.9 .08 .04 .07 .008 .25 .08
37,000–55,000 18.5 4.7 4.9 3.0 1.0 .12 20.7 .10 .07 .10 .011 .24 .13
55,000–85,000 20.3 4.8 4.9 3.2 1.1 .14 20.0 .13 .07 .13 .009 .19 .17
185,000 26.3 5.2 4.9 3.7 1.4 .14 19.1 .11 .05 .12 .006 .08 .178
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TABLE 5
Examples of Second Choices
Model nj
Modal Second
Choice
Number
Choosing
Next Second
Choice
(Modal
Next)/n
Number of
Different
Choices
Metro 188 Escort 22 Geo Storm .22 49
Cavalier 238 Escort 16 LeBaron .12 59
Escort 166 Tempo 16 Taurus .18 53
Corolla 250 Civic 42 Camry .33 55
Sentra 203 Corolla 34 Civic .31 60
Accord 223 Camry 58 Taurus .35 61
Taurus 147 Camry 18 Sable .22 45
Legend 119 Lexus ES300 19 Lexus SC300 .24 40
Seville 243 DeVille 38 Lincoln MK8 .26 49
Lexus LS400 148 DeVille 33 Inﬁniti Q45 .39 27
Caravan 166 Voyager 31 Aerostar .32 36
Quest 232 Caravan 50 Villager .43 31
Grand Cherokee 137 Explorer 75 Blazer .59 34
Trooper 137 Explorer 43 Rodeo .41 27
GMC Full-Size Pickup 469 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 222 Ford Full-Size Pickup .55 29
Toyota Pickup 113 Ford Ranger 29 Nissan Pickup .43 25
Econovan 90 Chevy Full-Size Van 20 Suburban .44 2386 journal of political economy
gives the ﬁrst-choice vehicle, and the second column gives the CAMIP
sample size n. The next columns, in order, give the modal second choice,
the number of sampled consumers making that choice, the second
choice with the second-highest number of consumers, the fraction of
n that chose one of the two second choices listed, and the number of
different second choices made. For example, the sample contains 166
purchasers of the Ford Escort. Their modal second choice was the Ford
Tempo, whereas the second choice with the next-highest number of
consumers was the Ford Taurus. Together these two second choices
accounted for 39, or 18 percent, of the consumers who chose the Escort.
There were 51 other second choices registered among Escort
purchasers.
There are a large number of different second choices for the same
ﬁrst-choice car, but the second choices are more concentrated for light
trucks and for higher-priced cars. Note also that the second choice is
often produced by the same company as the ﬁrst-choice car, a fact that
argues strongly for pricing policies that maximize the joint proﬁts of
the ﬁrm across all the products it produces.
As expected, the second-choice vehicles have characteristics that are
similar to those of the ﬁrst choices. The correlations of the different
vehicle characteristics across the ﬁrst and second choices of the house-
holds were all positive and highly signiﬁcant (the correlations for price
and minivan were largest, about .7; those for MPG, size, and other type
dummies were about .6; and the rest were between .3 and .5). Unfor-
tunately, the surveyed consumers are not asked whether they would have
purchased a vehicle at all if their ﬁrst choice had not been available,
so we cannot provide any descriptive evidence on how many consumers
might substitute out of the new vehicle market altogether if their ﬁrst
choice were unavailable.
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V. The Estimates of b
o and b
u
We begin with details of our speciﬁcation. Recall that utility (eq. [1])
has interaction terms of the form , where k indexes character- ˜  b x ik jk k
istics, i indexes households, and j indexes products. For all character-
istics except price, we assume that
ou ˜ ¯ b p b  z b  bn. (13)  ik k ir kr k ik
r
As in (2), the ’s are subsumed in the product-speciﬁc constants, d, and ¯ b
12 Some households listed a second choice that was broader than our ﬁrst-choice cells
(e.g., a Ford pickup). The empirical analysis explicitly aggregates the respective cell prob-
abilities for the second choices of these consumers.differentiated products 87
the n’s are assumed to have independent (across both consumers and
characteristics) standard normal distributions. Thus the are the stan-
u b
dard deviations of the contribution of unmeasured consumer attributes
to the variance in the marginal utility for characteristics k. We let the
descriptive tables and a number of preliminary runs guide our choice
of which to interact with the different . Observed interactions were z x ij
dropped from our early runs if we found them to be consistently
unimportant.
13
We assume the price coefﬁcient to be a function of effective wealth,
say W, and then model W in terms of household attributes. That is, our
price coefﬁcient is , so that its log is a decreasing function of
W e
ou W { z b  bn. (14)  ii r w ,rw i w
r
Initially the included a constant, family size, a spline in income that zi,r
was allowed to change derivatives at each of the quartiles of the CAMIP
income distribution, and a lognormally distributed (for determinants ni,w
of wealth not contained in our data). The data indicated needed only
a change in the derivative of the income/price interaction in the spline
at the seventy-ﬁfth income percentile.
We have little a priori information on the outside option of not buying
a car, so in early runs we let it be a linear function of all observed
household attributes, a random normal disturbance, and the “logit”
error. These runs indicated that the only attributes that mattered were
income, family size, and, sometimes, the number of adults.
Tables 6 and 7 provide the estimates from our full model (col. 1 in
each table) and compare them to those from more traditional models.
Table 6 presents estimates of the coefﬁcients of interactions with
o b
observed household attributes, and table 7 presents estimates of the
coefﬁcients of interactions with unobserved attributes. There are
u b
three comparison models. The ﬁrst two are obtained from our full
speciﬁcation but with , giving us a standard logit model with
u b p 0
closed-form probabilities. This model has both choice-speciﬁc intercepts
and interactions between observed household attributes and vehicle char-
acteristics (so we still have to use simulation to obtain predictions for
aggregate shares; see also Berry et al. [2001, app. A]). Column 2 of
table 6 provides the estimates obtained when using only ﬁrst-choice data,
and column 3 provides the estimates using both ﬁrst- and second-choice
data. The third comparison model sets , and so does not appear
o b p 0
in table 6 (just in table 7). This model is like the BLP model in that it
has no observed consumer attributes.
13 Our use of preliminary runs gives us some conﬁdence that our results are reasonably
robust to the inclusion of further interactions. However, it makes our standard errors
suspect in the usual way.88
TABLE 6
Estimates of Interaction Terms,
o b
Vehicle Characteristic and
Household Attribute
Full
Model
(1)
Logit
First
(2)
First and
Second
(3)
Price:
Constant 2.18
(.142)
.092
(.0001)
.139
(.0003)
Income#(income !75th
percentile)
.714
(.044)
.299
(.002)
.344
(.001)
Income#(income 175th
percentile)
1.17
(.083)
.466
(.091)
.603
(.007)
Family size .565
(.010)
.144
(.001)
.143
(.006)
Minivan: Kids (kids have age
≤16)
1.973
(.242)
.765
(.098)
.771
(.323)
Pass:
Adults (adults have age 116) .203
(.095)
.018
(.0004)
.067
(.009)
Family size .536
(.052)
.055
(.003)
.006
(.0002)
Age (of household head) .019
(.003)
.002
(.00001)
.005
(.00001)
HP: Age .002
(.001)
.010
(.0004)
.012
(.0001)
Acc:
Age .0004
(.001)
.001
(.00001)
.002
(.0001)
Age
2 .0001
(.00001)
.000
(.00001)
.000
(.00001)
PUPayl:
Age .0174
(.002)
.003
(.0001)
.000
(.00001)
Rural dummy 1.075
(.179)
.512
(.005)
.376
(.008)
Safe: Age .013
(.0006)
.015
(.001)
.016
(.0004)
SUV:
Age .219
(.010)
.043
(.003)
.043
(.004)
Rural dummy .332
(.156)
.403
(.007)
.016
(.002)
Allw: Rural dummy .278
(.247)
.142
(.005)
.734
(.246)
Outside good:
Total income 5.151
(.228)
.228
(.096)
.305
(.063)
Family size .007
(.002)
.532
(.057)
.346
(.004)
Adults .428
(.766)
.851
(.112)
1.953
(.148)89
TABLE 7
Estimates of Interaction Terms,
u b
Parameter Name
Full Model
(1)
o b { 0
(2)
Price .449
(.026)
.055
(.004)
HP .030
(.016)
.183
(.020)
Pass 2.74
(.147)
1.444
(.055)
Sport .002
(.0004)
2.763
(.068)
Acc .554
(.078)
.515
(.055)
Safe .260
(.130)
.376
(.093)
MPG .488
(.018)
.430
(.017)
Allw .740
(.179)
.431
(.049)
Minivan 4.787
(.353)
6.641
(.113)
SUV 3.076
(.292)
3.231
(.114)
Van 1.713
(.289)
6.888
(.266)
PUPayl 2.160
(.092)
4.301
(.210)
SUVPayl .356
(.072)
.015
(.013)
Chrysler 1.689
(.058)
1.383
(.051)
Ford .915
(.072)
1.410
(.051)
GM 1.885
(.057)
1.844
(.105)
Honda .329
(.128)
.086
(.043)
Nissan .506
(.142)
1.588
(.071)
Toyota .169
(.134)
.576
(.094)
Small Asian* 1.467
(.068)
2.155
(.022)
European* .454
(.084)
1.883
(.034)
Outside good 27.858
(1.004)
10.256
(.506)
* We constrained the coefﬁcients on the dummies for the different Eu-
ropean ﬁrms to be the same, and we did the same for the smaller Asian
producers.90 journal of political economy
There was one other comparison model we tried to estimate: our full
model using only the ﬁrst-choice data (like the results in col. 2). How-
ever, even after substantial experimentation, we had convergence prob-
lems with these runs, and it eventually became clear that very different
parameter values could generate values of the objective function that
were essentially the same as that of the minimum of that function.
Apparently it is the availability of second-choice data that enables us to
focus in on a set of precise parameter estimates. Note that since we have
only a single cross section, there is no variance in the choice set across
observations.
14 In applications to other data sets, variation in the choice
set (either over time or across markets) might provide the information
necessary to estimate the random coefﬁcients.
The ﬁrst four rows of table 6 show that all three observed interactions
with price are sharply estimated and have the expected sign (all else
equal, larger families have lower “wealth”). Indeed almost all interac-
tions in table 6 both had an expected sign and were precisely estimated
in all three speciﬁcations.
15 In addition to the price interactions, this
includes the interactions between minivans and kids (), age and pas-
sengers (), age and safety (), HP and age (), SUV and age (),
and rural and pickup payload ().
The full model had only one parameter estimate that might be con-
sidered an anomaly (the positive age/pickup payload interaction); the
ﬁrst-choice logit estimates had as their sole clear anomaly a negative
interaction between number of passengers and family size (and the
implication of this is ameliorated by the highly positive interactions
between the minivan dummy and kids and between adults and passenger
size). The second-choice logits do a little worse, predicting negative
interactions between family size and passengers and between rural and
the SUV dummy. The logits also have a pattern of outside good coef-
ﬁcients that is counterintuitive. While estimates from our full model
imply that households with more income and smaller families tend to
have larger values for the outside option, the logits predict the oppo-
site.
16 However, the outside good’s coefﬁcients are reduced form and
hence are more difﬁcult to interpret.
On the whole the logits performed quite well in terms of producing
14 A referee noted that random coefﬁcients models have been found unstable in many
related cross-sectional contexts. For a review of random coefﬁcients models, see Mc-
Culloch, Polson, and Rossi (2000) and the literature cited there.
15 We did not present the breakdown of the variance in the estimated coefﬁcients into
portions caused by simulation and sampling error, but typically somewhat less than half
of this variance is due to simulation.
16 Note that though our full model predicts a higher value of the outside good for
higher-income people, it also predicts a higher probability of purchasing a vehicle for
higher-income people, since the negative price interactions with income more than offset
the positive interactions with the outside good.differentiated products 91
sensible signs for coefﬁcients, so the increased computational burden
of the full model is not obviously justiﬁed by the pattern of estimated
interactions between x and z. However, while the demographic inter-
action terms both seem to make sense and are sharply estimated, table
7 indicates that they apparently do not explain the full pattern of sub-
stitution in the data. The estimated coefﬁcients are large and very
u b
precisely estimated. No matter how many observed interactions we al-
lowed for, we needed numerous additional unobserved interactions to
explain the data. Of course if we had richer consumer data, we would
hope to capture more with household observables; but the CAMIP data
do have most of the household attributes generally available in large
consumer choice data sets.
As shown in table 7, 19 out of 22 coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant
(11 with t-values over 10) and two are marginally signiﬁcant. Interest-
ingly, there seems to be a wider dispersion of preferences for vehicles
of U.S. companies than for those of Japanese companies. The model
with no observed attributes has even more precisely estimated co-
u b
efﬁcients (col. 2) since it has fewer other coefﬁcients to estimate. Indeed
the model has all coefﬁcients signiﬁcant and several with t-
ou b { 0 b
values over 50.
A clear pattern emerged when we compared the ﬁt of the various
models. The full model ﬁt the (uncentered) moments derived from the
interactions between observed consumer attributes and ﬁrst-choice car
characteristics (eq. [8]) about as well as the ﬁrst- and the second-choice
logits did, whereas the model with no observed interactions could not
ﬁt these moments at all. On the other hand, the model with no observed
interactions ﬁt the (uncentered) covariance of the ﬁrst- and second-
choice car characteristics (eq. [12]) about as well as the full model did,
but the percentage errors in the ﬁrst- and second-choice logits for these
moments were typically ﬁve to 10 times as large.
The logits, then, provide an adequate ﬁt for the correlations between
observed household and vehicle characteristics but do very poorly in
matching the characteristics of the ﬁrst- and second-choice car. This
might lead us to believe that the logits will predict the demographics
of consumers well but do a poor job of predicting substitution patterns.
The model with no observed attributes provides an adequate ﬁt for the
correlations of the characteristics of the ﬁrst- and second-choice car but
has no prediction at all for the correlations between the observed house-
hold and the observed vehicle characteristics. Our full model (which
nests all speciﬁcations) does about as well as the best of the alternatives
in both these dimensions.92 journal of political economy
VI. b and Substitution Patterns ¯
The only demand parameters left to estimate are the , the effects of ¯ b
the characteristics on the choice-speciﬁc intercepts (the ). Recall that {d } j
K
¯¯ d p p b  x b  y . (15)  jj p j k k j
k(p
The problems encountered in estimating equation (15) are similar to
the problems discussed in BLP in the context of estimating demand
systems from product-level data. In particular, consistent estimation of
(15) requires instruments at least for the endogenous prices. Note that
in contrast to our single 1993 cross section, BLP had 20 annual cross
sections. Still their estimates that used only the demand system were
too imprecise to be useful. This suggests that we also will have a precision
problem, but this time for only a subset of the parameters, . ¯ b
A number of additional sources of information could be used to
increase the precision of the estimated . First, we could mimic the BLP ¯ b
study. The authors assumed (i) a functional form for marginal costs and
(ii) a Nash equilibrium in prices. This generates a pricing equation that
can be used in conjunction with the d equation to increase the precision
of our estimates of . In particular, if marginal costs are given by ¯ b
mc p x g  q , (16)  jk j k j
k
where is an unobserved productivity term that is mean independent qj
of x and the g are a set of parameters to be estimated, then the equi-
librium assumption implies that price is equal to marginal cost plus a
markup:
ou ¯ p p x g  b(x, p, d, b , b , b )  q , (17)  jk j k 1 jj
where the form of is determined by the demand-
ou ¯ b(x, p, d, b , b , b ) 1
side parameters and the Nash pricing assumption.
With single-product ﬁrms, the markup would be the (familiar) inverse
of the semi-elasticity of demand with respect to price. Since we have
multiproduct ﬁrms, we must use the more complex formula for that
case (see, e.g., Berry et al. 1995).
The equilibrium markup in (17) is determined, in part, by y, q, and
p and hence needs to be instrumented when that equation is estimated.
In addition to , the instruments we use are predictions of the markup: xj
ˆ ou ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ¯ ˆ b { b(x, p, d, b , b , b ), (18) jj 1 j
where are obtained by projecting our estimate of d and the ob- ˆ ˆ (d, p)
served p onto the x’s, and is obtained from an initial instrumen- ˆ ¯ bpdifferentiated products 93
tal variable estimate of the d equation. So is a function only of the ˆ bj
x’s and consistent parameter estimates.
17
Notice that this method of identifying relies on our pricing as- ¯ b
sumption (though our estimates of do not) and relies quite
ou (b , b )
heavily on functional form restrictions (we do not observe multiple
prices for a given vehicle). This suggests looking for other ways of iden-
tifying . Moreover, since the equilibrium markups and price elasticities ¯ b
depend only on the coefﬁcients estimated in the ﬁrst-stage analysis and
on and equation (15) implies that , we can analyze ¯ d /p d /p p b jj jj p
all price change effects from the estimates of (d, , ) and any single
ou bb
restriction that identiﬁes .
18 On the basis of their experience, the staff ¯ bp
at General Motors suggested that the aggregate (market) price elasticity
in the market for new vehicles was near one. An alternative estimate of
is then the value that sets the 1993 market elasticity equal to one. ¯ bp
When we use the d equation (15) alone, the instrumental variable
estimates of are too imprecise to be of much use (our estimate of ¯ b
had a standard error 10 times the point estimate: 25 vs. 2.5). The ¯ bp
instrumental variable estimate of from the two-equation model (which ¯ bp
uses the d equation and the pricing assumption) is 3.58 and has a
standard error of 0.22. The estimate of that “calibrates” to GM’s ¯ bp
market elasticity of 1i s11. We consider these two estimates as well
as the estimate implicit in studies that ignore the correlation between
the product-speciﬁc constant terms and price: . ¯ b p 0 p
Table 8 examines the implications of these three estimates of . Panel ¯ bp
A provides the implied average (across vehicles) price semi-elasticities
and total market price elasticities. Panel B presents the coefﬁcients ob-
tained from the projection of the implied price semi-elasticities onto
car characteristics.
Clearly the level of the price elasticities increases with the value of the
estimate of . On the other hand, the pattern of the elasticities seems ¯ bp
fairly robust across our estimates of and accords well with industry ¯ bp
reports (especially to reports circa 1993). Semi-elasticities decrease in
price, and given price, vans (both mini and full-sized), pickups, SUVs,
and, to a lesser extent, sports cars have noticeably smaller elasticities
than other vehicles. This goes a long way toward explaining reports of
high markups for these vehicles.
We now come to the patterns of substitution across cars. The two types
17 Actually we iterate on this procedure several times; i.e., we use an initial simple in-
strumental variable estimate from the d equation alone to produce our ﬁrst estimate of
. Then we construct and use it in a method of moments routine based on the orthog- ˆˆ bb
onality conditions from both equations. This produces a new estimate for , which is ¯ bp
used to produce another estimate of , which was used in another method of moments ˆ b
routine. We continued in this way until convergence.
18 Similarly, if we were interested in elasticities with respect to any other characteristic,
say MPG or HP, we would require only the associated with the characteristic of interest. ¯ b94 journal of political economy
TABLE 8
Implications of Alternative Estimates of ¯ bp
Value of ¯ bp
0 3.58 11
A. Implied Average across Vehicles
Mean semi-elasticity .75 3.94 10.56
Total market elasticity .2 .4 1
B. Coefﬁcients from Projecting Semi-
elasticities
Price .016
(.003)
.031
(.006)
.063
(.014)
HP .023
(.025)
.025
(.044)
.122
(.102)
Pass .023
(.029)
.057
(.052)
.127
(.121)
Sport .235
(.069)
.230
(.117)
.219
(.273)
Acc .086
(.023)
.066
(.040)
.023
(.093)
Safe .177
(.038)
.137
(.067)
.052
(.126)
MPG .010
(.007)
.034
(.013)
.126
(.029)
Allw .084
(.103)
.275
(.182)
.671
(.425)
Minivan .174
(.099)
.730
(.174)
1.882
(.406)
SUV .480
(.179)
.923
(.316)
1.841
(.735)
Van .339
(.154)
1.112
(.272)
2.714
(.633)
PUPayl .173
(.050)
.625
(.088)
1.562
(.204)
SUVPayl .107
(.101)
.058
(.144)
.400
(.416)
Note.—Firm dummies are suppressed.
of substitution patterns we consider are (i) substitution induced by price
changes and (ii) substitution induced by deleting vehicles from the
choice set. The two sets of substitution patterns differ because when
price increases, only a selected sample of consumers who purchased the
given vehicle substitute out of that vehicle (the more price-sensitive
consumers), whereas when a vehicle is deleted from the choice set, all
of them must make an alternative choice. These substitution patterns
were virtually independent of the estimates of , so we present only ¯ bp
one set of results (with ). ¯ b p 3.58 p
Table 9 presents our model’s predictions for the substitution patterns
that would result from a small increase in price of the vehicle in the
ﬁrst column. The table provides the name of the vehicle chosen by theTABLE 9
Price Substitutes for Selected Vehicles: Estimates from the Full Model
Vehicle Price
Semi-
elasticity Best Substitute Price Movers* (%) Second Best Price Movers* (%) To Outside
† (%)
Metro 7.84 1.77 Tercel 9.70 14.96 Festiva 7.41 10.57 17.96
Cavalier 11.46 4.08 Escort 11.49 8.62 Tempo 10.78 6.80 6.81
Escort 11.49 4.02 Tempo 10.78 8.21 Cavalier 11.49 7.29 6.56
Corolla 14.51 3.92 Civic 14.00 8.08 Escort 11.49 7.91 5.00
Sentra 11.78 3.79 Civic 14.00 13.36 Escort 11.49 4.70 6.55
Accord 17.25 3.92 Camry 18.20 8.60 Civic 13.00 4.47 5.06
Taurus 17.65 3.73 Accord 17.25 6.25 Mercury Sable 18.66 6.09 3.97
Legend 32.42 3.73 Accord 17.25 3.96 Camry 18.20 3.87 4.38
Seville 43.83 3.16 DeVille 34.40 10.12 El Dorado 35.74 8.04 5.57
Lexus LS400 51.29 3.43 Mercedes 300 47.71 7.97 Lincoln Town Car 35.68 6.29 5.87
Caravan 17.56 3.32 Voyager 17.59 35.11 Aerostar 18.13 10.19 5.20
Quest 20.55 3.98 Aerostar 18.13 12.50 Caravan 17.56 10.38 5.48
Grand Cherokee 25.84 3.06 Explorer 24.27 17.60 Cherokee 20.10 9.51 6.38
Trooper 22.78 3.96 Explorer 24.27 17.53 Grand Cherokee 25.85 8.50 5.42
GMC Full-Size Pickup 16.76 3.78 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 16.78 43.74 Ford Full-Size Pickup 16.68 13.56 6.03
Toyota Pickup 13.77 3.34 Ranger 11.74 20.53 Nissan Pickup 11.10 11.93 9.35
Econovan 24.54 2.86 Chevy Van 25.96 12.90 Dodge Van 23.71 9.73 5.38
* Of those who substitute away from the given good in response to the price change, the fraction who substitute to this good.
† Of those who substitute away from the given good in response to the price change, the fraction who substitute to the outside good.96 journal of political economy
largest fraction of the substituting consumers, the price of that vehicle,
and the fraction of those who substitute out of the ﬁrst-choice vehicle
who move to that “best” substitute. It then provides the same information
for the vehicle chosen by the second-highest fraction of the substituting
consumers. The last column of the table provides the fraction of the
substituting consumers who substitute to the outside alternative. Thus
the best (price) substitute for the Toyota Corolla is the Honda Civic
and the second-best is the Ford Escort. Together these two cars account
for about 25 percent of those who substitute out of the Corolla when
its price rises. About 5 percent of those who substitute out do not pur-
chase a car at all.
The substitution patterns in table 9 make a lot of sense. Both substi-
tutes tend to be the same type of vehicle as the vehicle whose price rose
(minivans substitute to minivans etc.). Among vehicles of the same type,
the substitutes tend to be vehicles with prices and size similar to those
of the car whose price increased.
Table 10 compares best price substitutes from our model to those
from our comparison models. It is clear that the intuitive features of
the predictions of our model are not shared by the results from the logit
models but are, for the most part, shared by the results from the model
with no observed attributes. The ﬁrst-choice logit predicts the Dodge
Caravan, a minivan, to be the “best substitute” for nine of the 10 ﬁrst-
choice cars and predicts the Ford Econovan to be the best substitute
for the tenth car (a 400 series, or “high-end,” Lexus). It also predicts
the Dodge Caravan to be the best substitute for both pickups, both
SUVs, and the full-size van. The ﬁrst- and second-choice logit has the
Ford full-sized pickup as the best substitute for all 10 cars.
Apparently the observed characteristics of households do not capture
enough of the variation in individual tastes to produce reasonable sub-
stitution patterns.
19 On the other hand, the model with no observed
attributes ( ) produces the same best substitutes as our full model
o b { 0
in 12 out of the 17 cases (though its substitutes for the Escort and, to
a lesser extent, for the Metro seem questionable). If we are primarily
interested in substitution patterns, allowing for interactions between
unobserved consumer and product characteristics seems far more im-
portant than allowing for the interactions between the observed con-
sumer and product characteristics in our data. Again, recall that our
consumer-level data contain most of the variables that are generally
available in large micro data sets.
Because of our second-choice data, we are able to compare the mod-
19 This might have been expected from the logit’s inability to ﬁt the moments for the
characteristics of the ﬁrst- and second-choice cars. Note that this is in spite of our allowing
for choice-speciﬁc constant terms.TABLE 10
Price Substitutes for Selected Vehicles: A Comparison among Models
Vehicle Full Model
Logit
Sigma Only First First and Second
Metro Tercel Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Civic
Cavalier Escort Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Escort
Escort Tempo Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Ranger
Corolla Escort Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Civic
Sentra Civic Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Civic
Accord Camry Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Camry
Taurus Accord Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Accord
Legend Town Car Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Town Car
Seville DeVille Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup DeVille
Lexus LS400 Mercedes 300 Econovan Ford Full-Size Pickup Seville
Caravan Voyager Voyager Voyager Voyager
Quest Aerostar Caravan Caravan Aerostar
Grand Cherokee Explorer Caravan Chevy Full-Size Pickup Explorer
Trooper Explorer Caravan Chevy Full-Size Pickup Rodeo
GMC Full-Size Pickup Chevy Full-Size Pickup Caravan Chevy Full-Size Pickup Chevy Full-Size Pickup
Toyota Pickup Ranger Caravan Chevy Full-Size Pickup Ranger
Econovan Dodge Van Caravan Ford Full-Size Pickup Dodge Van98 journal of political economy
els’ predictions for substitution patterns to the data. Table 11 provides
the most popular second choice as predicted by the four models. These
are the “best substitutes” when the good in the ﬁrst column is taken off
the market. We also ranked the actual data on second choices and placed
the data rank of the model’s best substitute next to the name of the
predicted substitute. Thus, if the Honda Accord were taken off the
market, both our model and the model predict that the biggest
o b p 0
beneﬁciary would be the Toyota Camry; the data indicate that the Camry
is in fact the most popular second choice among Accord purchasers.
Our full model predicts exactly the same best substitute as the data nine
out of 17 times, predicts one of the top three best substitutes 15 out of
17 times, and never picks a best substitute that the data rank higher
than tenth (out of over 200 possible models). The model with
o b { 0
predicts the same best substitute as the data 12 out of 17 times but has
two best substitutes that the data rank above 10.
20 Meanwhile, the logit
models (i.e., ) perform as poorly here as they did in table 10,
u b { 0
with the Ford full-size pickup being predicted as the best substitute for
every car in all the logit speciﬁcations. Note also that the best price
substitutes and the best second choices are different for about half the
cars and one of the light trucks.
VII. Prediction Exercises
Having shown that the implications of our estimate are consistent with
available information, we move on to two prediction exercises. First, we
evaluate the potential demand for new models; in particular we intro-
duce “high-end” SUVs. Second, we use the system to evaluate a major
production decision: shutting down the Oldsmobile division of General
Motors. We ask what Oldsmobile purchasers would do were the cars
they bought not available. These examples were chosen for their rele-
vance. Several new SUVs were introduced in the late 1990s (an apparent
response to the high markups being earned on those vehicles in the
period of our data; see table 8), and GM announced its intention to
close down its Oldsmobile division in 2000.
Two caveats are worth noting before we go to the results. First, all
the data used in our investigations are 1993 data. The market has
changed since 1993, and those changes might well affect our estimates.
Second, in the exercises done here, we do not allow other actors in the
market to respond to the change we are investigating. That is, when
20 The one set of substitutes that might be considered an anomaly are the predicted
substitutes for the Legend. Our model predicts the much cheaper Civic, which is in fact
the choice of a small though signiﬁcant number of Legend buyers. The model
o b p 0
predicts the Lincoln Town Car, which is priced close to the Legend, but in fact Legend
consumers almost never indicate it as a second choice.TABLE 11
Most Popular Second Choices: A Comparison among Models and to the Data
Vehicle Full Model Rank Logit First Rank
Logit First
and Second Rank
o b { 0 Rank
Metro Chevy Geo Storm 2 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Tercel 12
Cavalier Sun Bird 3 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Escort 1
Escort Tempo 1 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Tempo 1
Corolla Escort 6 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Civic 1
Sentra Civic 2 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Civic 2
Accord Camry 1 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Camry 1
Taurus Mercury Sable 2 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Accord 4
Legend Civic 10 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Town Car ≥25
Seville Deville 1 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Deville 1
Lexus LS400 MB 300 3 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 DeVille 2 1
Caravan Voyager 1 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Voyager 1 Voyager 1
Quest Aerostar 7 Ford Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Caravan 1 Caravan 1
Grand Cherokee Explorer 1 Chevy Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Chevy Full-Size Pickup ≥25 Explorer 1
Trooper Explorer 1 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 22 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 22 Rodeo 2
GMC Full-Size Pickup Chevy Full-Size Pickup 1 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 1 Ford Full-Size Pickup 2 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 1
Toyota Pickup Ranger 1 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 4 Chevy Full-Size Pickup 4 Ranger 1
Econovan Chevy Van 1 Ford Full-Size Pickup 6 Ford Full-Size Pickup 6 Chevy Van 1100 journal of political economy
the Oldsmobile division is shut down, we do not allow for either a
realignment of the prices of other products in response to the shutdown
or the introduction of the new models that might follow such a shut-
down. Similarly, when a new model is introduced, we investigate demand
responses under the twin assumptions that prices of other vehicles do
not respond to the introduction of that model and that no further new
vehicles are introduced.
It is not much more difﬁcult to modify our procedure to ﬁnd a set
of prices that would be a Nash equilibrium to the situation we study.
This would, however, require (i) estimates of costs as well as of demand
functions and (ii) an assumption on how prices are set. In the past when
we have tried similar exercises, we found the impact of the price re-
sponse to be “second”-order in cases similar to the cases we investigate
here but to be central to the analysis of other issues.
21 On the other
hand, we have done very little that examines the longer-term responses
of the other characteristics (other than price) of the vehicles marketed
to changes in the environment.
A. New Models
The two new models introduced into the 1993 market are a new Mer-
cedes and a new Toyota SUV. Both new models were introduced with
all characteristics but price and the unobserved characteristic (i.e., y)
set equal to the characteristics of the Ford Explorer. The Explorer was
the biggest-selling SUV in 1993.
Recall that y captures the effect of all the detailed characteristics that
are omitted from our speciﬁcation; we think of it as an “unobserved
quality.” The y of the new Toyota SUV was set equal to the mean y of
all Toyota cars marketed in that year, and the price of that vehicle was
obtained from a regression of price onto a large set of vehicle char-
acteristics and company dummies. This latter regression had a very good
ﬁt, and using it allowed us to avoid using the explicit pricing and cost
assumptions that would be needed to obtain price from a more complete
model. The y and p of the new Mercedes SUV were set in the same way
using the “low end” of the Mercedes vehicles marketed in 1993.
22 Both
21 These studies used product-level data and the BLP methodology. Induced priceeffects
were second-order in our analysis of the response of demand to the increase in gas prices
in the early 1970s (Pakes et al. 1993). However, we found the price effects to be central
in our analysis of voluntary export restraints (Berry et al. 1999) and in an unpublished
analysis of particular mergers.
22 The mean quality and price of the Mercedes were much higher than the quality and
price of any SUV marketed at the time. So if we used the means of the Mercedes, we
would have been making predictions way out of the range of the data we used in our
estimation (and probably also out of the range of the SUV eventually marketed by
Mercedes).differentiated products 101
TABLE 12
Introducing a Mercedes SUV
Model Price Old Share New Share
New  Old
Share
New car 33,659 .0000 .0762 .0762
Biggest Declines in Sales
Ford Explorer 24,274 .2518 .2373 .0144
Jeep Grand Cherokee 25,849 .1475 .1376 .010
Chevy S10 Blazer 22,651 .1106 .1071 .0036
Toyota 4Runner 25,548 .0380 .0347 .0033
Nissan Pathﬁnder 24,943 .0397 .0375 .0022
Luxury cars* .1610 .1565 .0045
All vehicles 9.711 9.711 .000
Note.—Characteristics of the new car are described in the text.
* Cars priced above $30,000.
vehicles introduced are at the very upper end of the quality and price
distributions of the SUVs offered in 1993; the Toyota SUV’s price
($30,240) is $4,500 more than the most expensive SUV sold in 1993,
and the Mercedes’ price is $3,500 above that.
Table 12 summarizes results from introducing the Mercedes SUV. It
did well, capturing about a third of the market share of the Explorer.
The total number of vehicles sold hardly changed at all with the intro-
duction; the demand for the Mercedes SUV comes largely at the expense
of other SUVs and, to a far lesser extent, luxury cars. The Toyota SUV’s
introduction was somewhat less successful at our predicted price: its
market share was only .05. To increase the Toyota SUV’s market share
to that of the Mercedes, we found that Toyota would have had to cut
$1,000 off the price of its entrant. Our top predicted losers from the
introduction of the Toyota SUV were the same as those for the intro-
duction of the Mercedes SUV, but when the Toyota was introduced, the
fall in the market share of luxury cars was much smaller. The Toyota
Camry was the only nonluxury car that was in the top 15 of falls in sales,
and it was in that list when either new SUV was introduced.
We cannot do a precise comparison of our out-of-sample predictions
to the actual introduction of, say, the Mercedes M-Class SUV because
there are many other confounded factors (the introduction of other
new products and important macroeconomic shocks). However, we can
note that the introduction of the Mercedes was generally considered to
be very successful and was thought to put strong competitive pressure
on other SUVs and on other luxury car makers (which is consistent with
our prediction).102 journal of political economy
TABLE 13
Discontinuing the Oldsmobile Division
Old Share New Share New  Old Share
All Oldsmobiles .237 0 .237
All GM 3.126 3.016 .110
All cars 9.711 9.695 .016
Non-Olds Share Changes
Chevy Lumina .1354 .1548 .0194
Buick LeSabre .1216 .1336 .0120
Pontiac GrandAm .1322 .1441 .0119
Honda Accord .2955 .3039 .0084
Ford Taurus .2040 .2115 .0075
Saturn SL .1465 .1539 .0074
Toyota Camry .2343 .2415 .0072
Buick Century .0614 .0683 .0069
Pontiac Grand Prix .0517 .0584 .0067
Chevy Cavalier .1700 .1767 .0067
Pontiac Bonneville .0658 .0721 .0064
Note.—The original Oldsmobile models in the data (and their shares) are Ciera (.068), Cutlass Supreme (.059),
Olds 88 (.050), Achieva (.033), Olds 98 (.019), and Bravada (.008).
B. Discontinuing the Oldsmobile Division
Table 13 provides the results from discontinuing the Oldsmobile division
of General Motors. This is of interest because GM has in fact recently
announced the phase-out of that division. In 1993 Oldsmobile had a
market share of about 2.44 percent of the total number of vehicles
purchased, whereas GM’s total share of vehicles purchased was 32.2
percent. When we drop the Oldsmobile models from the choice set,
the three vehicles that beneﬁt the most are all family-sized GM cars
(Chevy Lumina, Buick LeSabre, and Pontiac GrandAm). Still some of
the Olds purchasers shift to high-selling family-sized cars produced by
other companies, notably the Honda Accord, Ford Taurus, and Toyota
Camry. Overall, 43 percent of Oldsmobile car purchasers substitute to
a non-GM alternative, and GM’s market share falls to 31.1 percent. Of
course the proﬁt change to GM depends on the costs saved by discon-
tinuing Oldsmobile and on the markups of the GM cars that the Olds
purchasers substitute to (numbers that GM presumably has detailed
information on).
23
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the role of detailed consumer attribute data,
together with second-choice data, in estimating a demand system for
23 Since Oldsmobile is still in the process of shutting down, we cannot check our 1993-
based estimates against what actually will happen. Of course there are also a number of
other important changes in the market between 1993 and today.differentiated products 103
passenger vehicles. We ﬁnd that unobserved random coefﬁcients are
necessary to describe the relatively tight substitution patterns that are
found in the data. The second-choice data are very helpful in obtaining
precise estimates of the parameters that govern these substitution pat-
terns. However, either some outside information or cross-sectional var-
iation in choice sets must be used to pin down the absolute level of
elasticities. As we have shown, these sources of data, when taken to-
gether, provide rich demand systems that imply realistic out-of-sample
predictions.
Demand systems provide an important component of incentives for
market responses to many (if not most) policy and environmental
changes. We are hopeful that, given appropriate data, techniques that
extend those provided here will enable researchers to analyze these
changes in a useful way.
Appendix
Variances of Parameter Estimates
The variance-covariance of the parameters is determined by (i) the variance-
covariance of the ﬁrst-order conditions that deﬁne the estimator evaluated at
the true value of the parameters and (ii) the expectation of the derivative, with
respect to b, of the ﬁrst-order conditions that deﬁne the estimator evaluated at
(see Hansen [1982] for the formula given these two matrices). b0
The variance in our moments when evaluated at is generated by two sources v0
of randomness: (1) sampling error in the CAMIP means (e.g., from the variance
in ) and (2) simulation error in our calculations of the model’s
nj 1 [n ]  z ji i p1 j j
predictions. Since the simulation and sampling errors are independent of each
other and it is the difference between the sample mean and our model’s pre-
dictions that enters our objective function (see eqq. [8] and [12]), the variance
of the moment conditions can be expressed as the sum of the variances due to
sampling and simulation errors. The variance due to sampling error can be
consistently estimated by calculating the variance of the moment conditions at
the estimate of the parameter values holding the simulation draws constant.
The variance due to simulation error can be consistently estimated by simulating
the sample moment at the estimate of b for many independent sets of ns sim-
ulation draws and calculating the variance across the calculated moment
vectors.
24
The derivative matrix can be consistently estimated by taking the derivative
of the sample ﬁrst-order condition evaluated at the estimate of b, remembering
that, since we use a two-step estimator, that derivative is the sum of two terms:
one accounting for the direct effect of b on the moments given the estimate of
and one accounting for the effect of b on (see, e.g., Pakes and Olley d(b, 7) d(b)
1995).
24 For each set of draws we have to solve the contraction mapping for the that
N,ns ˆ d (b)
corresponds to that set of draws and use that estimate of in the calculation of the
N,ns ˆ d (b)
moments that go into (8) and (12). This is to account for the fact that the simulation
affects both the prediction of the micro moments given an estimate of and the d(b ) 0
estimate , i.e. , itself.
N,ns d (b ) d (b ) 00 0104 journal of political economy
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